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Search for Nonwage Job 
Characteristics: A Test of the 
Reservation Wage Hypothesis 
David M. Blau, University of North Carolina 
Previous structural models of job search behavior have been based 
upon the reservation wage property. This article provides estimates 
of a more general search model that nests models with the reservation 
wage property. The estimates lead to rejection of the reservation wage 
property. The model includes hours of work in the utility function, 
but other nonwage job characteristics can be included as well. An 
experiment based on the estimated parameters indicates that a signif- 
icant proportion of job offers would be mistakenly predicted to be 
accepted or rejected under the restrictions implied by the reservation 
wage property. 
I. Introduction 
Estimation of structural models of job search behavior has become in- 
creasingly common. Examples include Kiefer and Neumann (1979); Flinn 
and Heckman (1982); Lancaster and Chesher (1983); Narendranathan 
and Nickell (1985);Jensen and Westergard-Nielsen (1987); Wolpin (1987); 
Stern (1989); and Eckstein and Wolpin (1990). Such studies can provide 
greater insight into the job search process than studies based on reduced 
form estimates. For example, the issue of whether observed unemployment 
A previous version of this article was presented at the 1988 North American 
summer meetings of the Econometric Society in Minneapolis and in seminars at 
Duke University and Yale University. I am grateful to Philip Robins, Steven Stern, 
Kenneth Wolpin, and seminar participants for very helpful comments. I thank the 
National Science Foundation (grant SES-8605294) for financial support, Craig 
Richardson for research assistance, and Sarah Mason and Betsy Pierce for typing. 
I am responsible for all remaining errors. 
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durations are accounted for mainly by the rate of arrival of job offers or 
by the selectivity of searchers in accepting offers has begun to be addressed. 
All of the structural models of job search that have been estimated to 
date have assumed that the optimal search strategy has the reservation 
wage property.' This means, among other things, that searchers are assumed 
to be risk neutral (or risk averse with no recall of past offers), place no 
value on nonwage characteristics of jobs, and face a known and stationary 
distribution of wage offers. Some of these assumptions have been shown 
to be inconsistent with evidence in other contexts. For example, workers 
seem to care about the number of hours they work according to the labor 
supply literature (see, e.g., Killingsworth and Heckman 1986; and Pencavel 
1986), and they also seem to behave as if other nonwage job characteristics 
matter (see, e.g., Woodbury 1983). None of the studies in which structural 
models were estimated explicitly tested the reservation wage property. 
In this article, I estimate a job search model in which utility when em- 
ployed depends on weekly hours of work in addition to weekly earnings.2 
It is straightforward to show that such a model does not have the reservation 
wage property but instead has the reservation utility property. My estimates 
lead to rejection of the restrictions implied by the reservation wage property. 
More important, I find that imposing the reservation wage property on 
the model results in estimates that lead to a high frequency of incorrect 
predictions about acceptance or rejection of offers. This calls into question 
the value of predictions based on models estimated under the assumption 
that the reservation wage property holds. 
The contribution of this article may be viewed as a generalization of the 
typical empirical structural job search model and also as an effort to link 
empirical search models more closely to the literature on hours of work. 
The model presented here is consistent with alternative models of hours 
of work found in the literature. For example, the implicit contracts literature 
typically assumes that hours and earnings are part of a take-it-or-leave-it 
job package offered by firms (Abowd and Card 1987). In this model, 
workers are assumed to have no access to capital markets. Long-term con- 
1 Most of the studies cited assume that the unit of measurement for the reservation 
wage is a week. Stern (1989) measures wages on a daily basis, Jensen and Westergard- 
Nielsen (1987) on a monthly basis, and Flinn and Heckman (1982) on an hourly 
basis. The key point is that all previous studies assume income maximization. In 
this article the wage is measured on a weekly basis, so the reservation-wage hy- 
pothesis is actually the reservation-weekly-earnings hypothesis. 
2 The estimation method used in this study can easily incorporate multiple non- 
wage job characteristics. This extension was not implemented because of lack of 
data on additional job characteristics. See Rosen (1986, pp. 682-84) for a discussion 
of the literature on modeling hours of work as a nonpecuniary job characteristic. 
Khandker ( 1988) estimates a search model with two types of jobs, those with some 
form of nonwage payment (e.g., a bonus) and those without such payments. The 
method used in this article allows for a continuum of job types. 
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tracts between risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms with access to 
capital markets provide smooth consumption paths for workers. Hedonic 
models of labor market equilibrium often treat hours of work as a non- 
pecuniary job characteristic that is fixed for a given job but varies across 
jobs and for which a compensating wage differential may exist in equilib- 
rium (Rosen 1986). Labor supply models treat hours of work as subject 
to choice by the worker, given the hourly wage offered by the firm (e.g., 
Pencavel 1986). The results presented below can be interpreted within the 
context of any of these models, although it is not possible to use my results 
to test competing models of hours determination. Thus, this article shows 
that job search behavior and hours of work can be treated within a con- 
sistent empirical framework.3 
In the remainder of the article I describe the model (Sec. II), discuss 
econometric issues (Sec. III), describe the data used (Sec. IV), present and 
discuss the estimates and tests (Sec. V), and summarize the article 
(Sec. VI). 
II. The Model 
The model I present here is based on the model estimated by Wolpin 
(1987), extended to incorporate nonwage job characteristics. The model 
considers the behavior of an unemployed worker who, by paying an ex- 
ogenous cost C (measured in utility), can contact one firm each period 
and receive a job offer with known, exogenous probability Xt, where t 
indexes the duration of search.4 Financial constraints are assumed to limit 
the search horizon to T periods, after which the searcher, if still unem- 
ployed, must accept the next offer received. Thus, if the current duration 
of search is t < T, then T - t periods remain in which the worker can set 
a nonzero probability of rejecting an offer. If t > T the worker must 
accept any offer. There are no layoffs or quits once a job is accepted. 
An explicit functional form for utility is necessary for estimation, and 
the Cobb-Douglas utility function is one of the few tractable forms for 
this problem: 
U= WaQHa2 a, 2 O3 a2< (1) 
3 Burdett and Mortensen ( 1978) present a thorough analysis of a model in which 
job-search and labor-supply decisions are integrated. Their model has the reser- 
vation-wage property because hours are assumed to be freely chosen by workers 
as a function of offered wages. In the model I present below, the reservation-wage 
property is a special case. 
4 In the context of the specification discussed below, in which utility is a function 
of hours and wages, it is possible to model the optimal choice of time and money 
inputs to search, but such a model is too complicated to estimate in the present 
context. 
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where U is per-period utility when employed at earnings of W per period 
and hours of work of H per period.5 In the estimation, a period is taken 
to be a week, so W and H can be thought of as weekly earnings and hours 
of work, respectively. In the expected-wealth-maximization model, the 
restrictions a, = 1 and a2 = 0 are imposed. Job offers are assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random draws from the 
known, stationary, joint distribution F(x,y), where F(x,y) = pr(W < x, 
H < y). For estimation purposes I assume a joint lognormal distribution: 
InW = gR + as, (2) 
In H=9H +?2, (3) 
E(s,) = E(?2) = 03 (4) 
and 
(2)= E(=2) = o2, L(?l?2) 
= oS2, (5) 
where E is the mathematical expectation operator. In this model, firms are 
viewed as offering workers a job consisting of specified levels of weekly 
earnings and hours. Given the assumptions of the model, the optimal search 
strategy for workers has the reservation utility property: any offer with 
utility exceeding the reservation utility level is accepted.6 The reservation 
5 Identification of the utility function parameters is discussed below. Workers 
are assumed to have identical preferences. The estimation method, described below, 
requires explicit solutions for the expected value of utility, given that an acceptable 
offer was received. This requirement limits the choice of functional form for utility 
to the class of Cobb-Douglas and linear functions. Kiefer (1987) presents a model 
of search for wage-hour packages that is similar to the model given here. He argues 
(p. 218) that, if the utility function defined over, say, weekly consumption and 
leisure is increasing, concave, and has a positive cross derivative, then the utility 
function defined over the hourly wage and weekly hours of work should allow for 
the marginal utility of hours of work to be positive or negative, depending on 
whether offered hours are less than or greater than optimal hours at the offered 
wage rate. Equation (1) does not allow for this; instead the marginal utility of H 
is assumed to be negative for any value of H. This form is therefore not well suited 
for constrained utility maximization subject to a budget constraint. However, as 
discussed below, job offers are assumed to consist of a take-it-or-leave-it wage- 
hours package, so maximization of (1) subject to a budget constraint is not part 
of the model. Alternative functional forms for utility are discussed in Sec. V below. 
6 Rosen (1978) analyzes a consumer-search model with multiple goods, which 
is formally similar to the present model (although it is not dynamic) and also 
yields a reservation utility strategy for search. Wilde (1979) considers the case in 
which the nonwage characteristic of the job is revealed only by working on the 
job and cannot be ascertained before accepting the job. Altonji and Paxson (1988) 
model the behavior of employed workers who search from a wage-hours distri- 
bution. They assume no search costs and exactly one offer per period. 
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utility level changes with the duration of search because of the finite horizon 
and the possibly nonstationary offer probability. In principle, these two 
factors can interact to produce any pattern of reservation utilities that is 
consistent with the eventual decline of reservation utility to zero at T. No 
attempt is made here to solve for an equilibrium distribution of earnings 
and hours. The existence of the latter is taken as given. 
The value of being unemployed in period t < T is 
V,= XEmax {8tU,-C + RV,+1} ?+(1 -1 )E(-C + RVt+1), (6) 
where 8t = 1=t R', R = 1/(1 + r), r is the rate of time preference, t is 
the horizon for labor force participation, E is the expectations operator, 
and the search cost is paid in period t for the chance to receive an offer in 
period t + 1. The value function consists of a weighted average of the 
expected value of the best option, given that an offer is received, where 
the options are accepting or rejecting the offer and the expected value of 
continued search, given no offer is received. The weights are Xt and 
1 - Xt, respectively. The reservation level of utility in period t, denoted 
Ht. is defined by 
=tOt -C + RVt+l (7) 
since, from (6), -C + RVt+j is the expected present discounted value of 
searching in an optimal manner until period T. Once period T is reached, 
financial constraints are assumed to force searchers to accept the next offer, 
that is, set OT = 0, so the value of entering period T unemployed is 
X j-1 
VT = (Ri J-[ (1 - kk)] [,kj6EU - (1 - kj) Q) (8) 
j=T k=T 
where rl JT=(.) 1, and EU = exp(y + 2 a') is the expected utility per 
period of a random job offer, with y = at1w + a21H, and cT2 = 
+ ct2G2 + 2aja2G12. 
The advantage of the functional forms specified for utility and the wage- 
hours distribution is that they yield a tractable solution for the value func- 
tion. Vt can be written as 
Vt = Xt[E(6tUI &tU ? 6tOt) - pr(6tU ? 6tOt) + 6tOt * pr(6tU < t Ot)] 
+ (1 - At)6tot 
= Xt{6tEU[ 1 - /((i-t/ a )] ?+ 6tOtO(D/o} ? (1 -t)tOt 
where CI is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (CDF), 
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and fl, = In Ot - y. The first term in the square brackets is the expected 
present discounted value of the utility of a job offer, given that the offer 
is acceptable, multiplied by the probability that a random offer is acceptable. 
The second term in square brackets is the expected present discounted 
value of rejecting an offer and continuing to search according to the optimal 
strategy, multiplied by the probability that a random offer is unacceptable. 
The final term accounts for the probability of not receiving an offer. Sub- 
stituting (7) into (9) yields a nonlinear difference equation for Vt that can 
be computed recursively from T backward, given parameter values. The 
value function and decision rule each period depend on all future values 
of Xt, which are assumed to be known. This can be seen by successive 
substitution of (7) (updated) into (9). Hence the model generates truly 
forward-looking behavior. 
In the following section, identification and estimation of the parameters 
are discussed. In the remainder of this section, I point out the key difference 
between this model and its expected-wealth-maximization counterpart. In 
the latter version of the model, the optimal strategy has the reservation 
weekly earnings property. In figure 1, the log of reservation weekly earnings 
in period t, lnWt, is a horizontal line in lnW - In H space. That is, hours 
are presumed not to matter in the job-acceptance decision. In the expected- 
utility-maximizing model, the reservation utility level, Ot, defines an upward 
sloping straight line in lnW - In H space, with slope = -a2/aQ, given the 
presumption that a2 < 0.7 The latter model predicts that any earnings- 
hours offer located above this line will be accepted, that is, a low-earnings 
job might be accepted if the hours were low also, and a high-earnings job 
might be rejected if the hours were also high. If the utility-maximizing 
model is correct, then the wealth-maximizing model would incorrectly 
predict that offers located in area A in figure 1 would be rejected, and 
offers located in area B would be accepted. The larger -a2/al, the greater 
the probability of an incorrect prediction by the wealth-maximization 
model. In Section V below, I present estimates of the probabilities associated 
with areas A and B. 
A possible objection to a test of the expected-wealth-maximization hy- 
pothesis based on the model described above is that the test depends on 
the validity of the model, which is highly structured. However, a test is 
also possible based on a substantially less structured version of the model. 
In this version of the model, which I denote the unrestricted model, utility 
and job offers are still defined by ( 1 )-(5), and the assumption is maintained 
that the optimal search strategy is characterized by the reservation utility 
7 The equation for the indifference curve is linear in logs because of the Cobb- 
Douglas utility function: since Ot = Wc"Hc2 defines the values of W and H that 




slope = -a /aI 





property (which specializes to the reservation weekly earnings property 
when a, = 1 and a2 = 0). The difference is that the determination of 
reservation utility each period is left unspecified instead of being forced 
to follow the path dictated by the solution to the dynamic programming 
problem, (6)-(9). The reservation utility is estimated as a free parameter 
each period in this version, while in the dynamic programming model, the 
path of reservation utilities is determined by C and T. As discussed below, 
the key parameters needed to test the reservation weekly earnings property 
remain identified in the unrestricted model, permitting a more robust test. 
III. Econometric Issues 
The model described above was estimated by full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML). Before describing the estimation procedure, I discuss 
identification of the parameters. The data available for estimating the model 
include the duration of search and weekly earnings and hours on accepted 
jobs. The assumption of homogeneous workers is maintained. 
Wolpin (1987) shows that the parameters of the wealth-maximization 
version of this model are identified. The only new issue that arises in the 
utility-maximization model is identification of the utility function param- 
eters, a, and a2. A normalization is required since monotonic transfor- 
mations of the utility function specified in (1) will not alter the implications 
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of the model. I have chosen to set a, = 1 since under this restriction the 
expected-utility-maximizing model still nests expected wealth maximi- 
zation. With the restriction al.~ = 1, ci2 is identified by the hours data. This 
is also true in the unrestricted model. The dynamic programming model 
(also referred to as the restricted model) is nested in the unrestricted model, 
so an explicit test of the restrictions implied by the former is possible. 
To form the likelihood function for the model, two additional assump- 
tions are required. First, it is assumed that the offer arrival rate is given by 
= exp { Po + ? jt), allowing for duration dependence in the offer rate. 
The second additional assumption is made necessary by the fact that the 
model implies that U > Ot for any offer accepted in period t. There are 
two ways to impose this implication of the model in the estimation pro- 
cedure. One is to maximize the likelihood function subject to this constraint 
for each period up to T - 1. This is the strategy followed by Jensen and 
Westergard-Nielsen (1987) and by Flinn and Heckman (1982) in the sta- 
tionary case, but the maximum-likelihood procedure then becomes non- 
regular since the parameter estimates may be on the boundary of the pa- 
rameter space. An alternative procedure, similar to one implemented by 
Wolpin (1987) and Stern (1989), allows for measurement errors in observed 
wages and hours. For given parameter values, observing a value of U < Ot 
is then attributed to measurement error. This helps reduce the influence 
of outliers on the parameter estimates since without measurement error 
the job with the smallest value of U in the whole sample will have a major 
effect on the parameter estimates.8 I assume lnW0 =o + s + el and 
In Ho = 9H + 6 + e2, where W0 and Ho are observed wages and hours, 
and el and e2 are i.i.d. normally distributed, mean zero measurement errors 
with variances oe21 and Ge2, and zero covariances with each other and with 
the C's. These variances are identified by the fact that the offer-acceptance 
decision involves a comparison of true utility (the expected value of which 
depends on the true variances) with reservation utility, while the contri- 
bution of observed wages and hours to the likelihood function includes 
both the true variances and the measurement-error variances. 
An individual (i) who accepts a job in period t, contributes a term to 
the likelihood function for the probability of remaining unemployed for 
- 1 periods, and a term for the joint probability of becoming employed 
in period t1 and the observed value of utility on the accepted job. An 
8 For evidence that an unusually low wage can have a significant impact on 
parameter estimates in this context, see Flinn and Heckman (1982, p. 149), who 
infer a very low job offer arrival rate (one offer per 5-7 months) due to a low 
reservation-wage estimate derived from the smallest accepted wage in their sample 
($1.50 per hour). The rationale for the use of measurement error here is similar to 
the rationale for its use in the kinked budget constraint literature, which is to 
account for observations in theoretically inadmissable regions. See, e.g., Moffitt 
(1986). 
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individual who remains unemployed after being observed for t, periods 
contributes a term like the first one above (but for ti periods instead of 
t- 1). Let ? = sl + a2s2, e = el + a2e2, (Y2 = X21 + ao2, and p2 =(2/ 
(y2 + (y2) 
The likelihood function is 
Ii t1-1 
L = {J7J [Xi(J/) + (1 -XI)]} 
i=1 j=1 
f(j - () C(1 e )\ )] / (2 + e+ 
~~ ~ (lit - p2(s Sy2+e /y) ((y2 1 y2)5 1 0 
12 ti 
*fJ [fi (Xjc(1J/Y) + (1 - Xj))] 
i=1 j=1 
where I, is the number of completed spells, and I2 is the number of in- 
complete spells.9 The joint probability of observing an offer being accepted 
pr(s > qt), and the observed value of utility of the accepted offer (? + e) 
is decomposed into the conditional probability of ? > at, given the observed 
s + e (the term in square brackets), times the marginal density of ? + e, 
both of which are normal given the assumed normality of F, and e1, i = 1,2. 
As noted above, at each iteration of the likelihood function the value func- 
tion is computed recursively from period T backward in order to obtain 
estimates of qt to include in the likelihood function. In the unrestricted 
model, nt is a parameter to be estimated in each period in which any offers 
were accepted. 
Exogenous variables can be included in the model as determinants of 
any or all of the parameters. However, no attempt has been made to in- 
corporate unobserved heterogeneity because of the complexity of doing 
so, the arbitrariness of limiting the sources of such heterogeneity, and the 
fact that, in some cases, the parameters of the distributions of unobservables 
would be unidentified. 
IV. Data 
Data from the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) baseline 
household survey were used to estimate the model. This survey collected 
data in 20 sites in the United States during 1980 to serve as a baseline for 
9 A number of individuals in the sample described below had missing data on 
earnings. The likelihood function was modified to permit these cases to be used, 
assuming randomly missing data. For an individual who accepts a job in period t, 
but does not report weekly earnings, the term X,( 1 - 4(qt/aY)) replaces the second 
line of (10). The sample proportions of cases with missing data were used to weight 
the different likelihood terms. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics on Unemployment Spells 
Standard 
Mean Deviation 
Duration (weeks) 12.7 12.0 
= cornplete spell .64 .48 
Accepted weekly earnings 249 146 
Log of accepted weekly earnings 5.37 .55 
Accepted weekly hours 40.1 10.2 
Log of accepted weekly hours 3.66 .28 
NOTE.-The sample size is 329. Sample size for wages and hours is 194. Wages 
have been deflated to a January 1979 basis using the monthly consumer price 
index. 
evaluating the effects of the EOPP program, which was intended to provide 
intensive job search assistance and training to low-income individuals in 
selected sites. The program was canceled shortly after it was initiated, but 
the baseline survey provides a rich source of data on preprogram job search 
behavior. Low- and middle-income households were oversampled, but the 
sample was not truncated on income." I use a subsample of 329 white 
men aged 25-35 who graduated from high school but did not attend college 
and who experienced a spell of unemployment during the period covered 
by the survey, January 1979-October 1980. The sample has been restricted 
to a relatively homogeneous group in order to minimize the inclusion of 
explanatory variables, which increase the cost of estimation substantially. 
Retrospective labor market histories from the date of the survey (April- 
October 1980) back to January 1979 provide data on search activity during 
unemployment spells and earnings and hours on all jobs. 
In table 1, descriptive statistics on the variables used to estimate the 
model are presented, and in table 2 the frequency distribution of duration 
and the pattern of hazard rates are given. The average duration of a spell 
of unemployment is about 13 weeks and 65% of all spells are 13 weeks or 
less, while 73% of all completed spells are 13 weeks or less. The hazard 
rate appears to decline after about 13-15 weeks of duration. There is con- 
siderable dispersion in accepted hours of work as well as in earnings, so 
the potential for the earnings-hours model to provide a better fit than the 
earnings-only model exists. 
V. Results 
A. Parameter Estimates 
Parameter estimates for the expected-utility-maximizing (EUM) and 
expected-wealth-maximizing (EWM) versions of the model without any 
" See Keeley and Robins (1985), Blau and Roberts (1986, 1990), and Blau (1989) 
for further discussion of the data. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Unemployment Spells by Duration 
Number of 
Duration Number of Complete Average Weekly 
(Weeks) Spells Spells Hazard Rate 
1-3 75 52 .058 
4-6 61 48 .070 
7-9 37 25 .043 
10-12 24 15 .031 
13-15 39 28 .050 
16-20 24 16 .032 
21-24 17 8 .026 
25-73 52 17 .010 
All 329 209 .050 
NOTE.-In the estimation each week is treated as a separate period. The data are 
reported for groups of weeks here and in other tables to save space. 
exogenous variables are presented in table 3.11 The estimates were obtained 
by maximizing the likelihood function with T, the search horizon, fixed 
at alternative values and then picking the value of T that yielded the largest 
likelihood.12 Estimates of unrestricted versions are presented as well. 
The estimates in table 3 indicate that both the cost of search and the 
rate of time preference are zero. A rate of time preference close to zero 
was also found by Wolpin, but his estimated cost of search is nonzero. 
The results here could indicate that C and r are statistically unidentified 
or could simply indicate that searchers are not impatient and have little 
or no opportunity cost for the resources devoted to search.13 Some of the 
other parameters are imprecisely estimated, though generally of reasonable 
magnitudes. However, a2 is estimated to be close to -1, and the estimate 
is significantly different from zero in both versions of the EUM model, 
suggesting rejection of the wealth-maximizing model. The value of the %2 
statistic from the likelihood-ratio test of the restrictions implied by the 
" Several specifications of the model were estimated with exogenous variables 
such as age and location in a standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) as 
determinants of mean wages and hours. In every case, likelihood ratio tests indicated 
that the fit of the model was not improved by including these variables, so they 
were dropped from the final version of the model. 
12 The NMSIMP method in the GQOPT package was used to reach the neigh- 
borhood of the maximum, and GRADX was used to generate the final estimates 
and standard errors. The working horizon, X, was set at 35 years in calculating VT. 
13 When the model was reestimated with r fixed at alternative values, C was still 
estimated to be zero, and the likelihood value was always lower than when r was 
unconstrained. A possible reason for the estimates of C and r being zero is that 
the search horizon, T, could capture the effect of discounting and search costs. 
That is, a short horizon has the same impact as a high discount rate and high search 
cost. 
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Table 3 
Maximum-Likelihood Parameter Estimates 
Restricted Models Unrestricted Models 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 0 0 
[t. 5.48(2.96) 5.38(.04) 4.26(1.72) 5.38 
Ia 2 .39(.43) .002(.003) .13(.65) .00 
el .14(.06) .31(.02) .14(.16) .32 
PBO -2.71(.18) -2.72(.15) -2.47(.17) -2.66 
Pi1 -.024(.009) -.022(.008) -.026(.009) -.02 
r 0 0 0 0 
11H 3.77(3.14) ... 2.55(1.89) ... 
(T 2 .48(.72) ... .16(.16) ... 
a 22 .16(.08) ... .09(.46) ... 
a2 -.93(.20) ... -.95(.22) ... 
'912 .43(.07) ... .10(.04) ... 
T 25 25 -1,038.39 -1,056.06 
in L -1,052.43 -1,062.00 
/(1 + el) .73 .005 .48 .00 
a2/(2 + a2) .75 ... .64 
G 1 2/(T 1 G2 .998 ... .712 ... 
E(W) 291 217 76 218 
SD(W) 201 10 28 0 
E(H) 55 ... 14 
SD(H) 43 ... 6 ... 
NOTE.-Estimated asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. These should be viewed with caution 
since they were generated using numerical derivatives and may be unreliable. The standard errors for C 
and r were very small and are probably unreliable, soare not reported here. Standard error estimates could 
not be obtained for the unrestricted model, which also included estimates of the reservation utility or 
wage in each period. The estimates are not reported here, but see n. 21. E = mathematical expectations 
operator; W = wages; H = hours; SD = standard deviation. 
expected-wealth-maximizing model is 19.1 using the estimates from the 
restricted models in columns 1-2. The critical value of a 12(5) variable is 
11.1 at the 5% level and 16.7 at the .5% level, so the restrictions are clearly 
rejected. 
It is interesting that the restriction a2 = -1 cannot be rejected, so a 
model in which the goal is to maximize the expected hourly wage 
(W/H) is consistent with the data. Also, as shown in the lower part of 
table 3, the estimated correlation between weekly earnings and weekly 
hours is essentially one in the restricted model (.71 in the unrestricted 
model).1 The joint distribution of earnings and hours, therefore, is esti- 
mated to degenerate to a univariate distribution of hourly wages. This may 
14 The correlation was constrained to fall between -1 and 1. Part of the expla- 
nation for the high correlation may be that part of the total variance of wages and 
hours is being attributed to measurement error. If the correlation is calculated using 
the total variances (true plus measurement error), the correlation falls to .74, closer 
to the observed correlation (.19) of accepted earnings and hours. 
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be consistent with hourly wage maximization by workers since, if workers 
are indifferent among jobs offering the same hourly wage and different 
weekly hours, then employers will not be constrained to offer hours that 
maximize workers' utility, and job offers need only consist of a specified 
hourly wage. However, this result is also consistent with a model in which 
workers maximize utility by choosing hours of work, given the hourly 
wage offer accepted. These alternative models cannot be distinguished em- 
pirically in the present context. It is important to stress that the results 
indicate that workers are clearly not indifferent to alternative combinations 
of weekly hours and weekly earnings. 
The other parameters that are estimated precisely are those of the offer 
arrival rate (P3o, IPi). The estimates in column 1 imply a weekly offer arrival 
rate of .065 in the first week of search and a rate of .037 by the twenty- 
fifth week. The estimate of T = 25 weeks is very close to the length of the 
period of eligibility for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. This may 
be a coincidence, but it certainly seems plausible that search behavior could 
become more constrained on expiration of UI benefits.15 
Some of the parameters of the joint distribution of earnings and hours 
are poorly determined in the EUM model results, although the point es- 
timates do not appear highly unreasonable.16 It is interesting to note that 
the EUM model results in column 1 indicate that accepted earnings are 
truncated from above, in contrast to the usual result of truncation from 
below in the EWM model (compare the mean of accepted earnings in 
table 1 to the estimated untruncated means in table 3). This is due to the 
fact that accepted hours of work are also estimated to be below the mean 
on average. Measurement error is estimated to account for about one- 
quarter of earnings and hours variation, respectively, in the column 1 re- 
sults.17 The most peculiar result is probably the very high proportion of 
15 About 55% of the sample received UI benefits. I attempted to incorporate 
these benefits in the cost of search, C, but with poor results. The results reported 
in table 3 do not incorporate the UI data. 
16 One reason for the imprecise estimates of the earnings-hours distribution may 
be the assumption of joint lognormality. Taking weekly wages and hours separately, 
x2 goodness-of-fit tests reject the lognormal specification for wages and, especially, 
hours. The distribution of accepted weekly hours appears to be unimodal and 
symmetric with a very high concentration around 40 (73% between 35 and 40). 
The only tractable alternative in this problem to the assumption of joint lognormality 
is joint normality together with a linear utility function (U = W + Q2H). The 
estimates for this version of the model were highly unreasonable and are therefore 
not reported. Another specification was estimated in which hours of leisure enters 
the Cobb-Douglas utility function directly and leisure hours are assumed to be 
distributed lognormally. This specification also yielded unreasonable results. 
17Duncan and Hill (1985) present measurement error variance estimates for 
earnings and hours based on comparing survey responses of workers to company 
records. Their results are for annual earnings and hours and are therefore not 
directly comparable to the estimates in table 3. Their estimates of the share of 
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earnings variance estimated to be accounted for by measurement error in 
the wealth-maximization estimates in columns 2 and 4. 
A formal test of the restricted models is discussed below, but an informal 
comparison of the restricted and unrestricted results is informative. The 
estimates of a2 are virtually identical, providing strong confirmation that 
rejection of the reservation weekly earnings property is not an artifact of 
a poorly specified structural model. The unrestricted model produces less 
reasonable estimates of the parameters of the earnings-hours distribution, 
except for the correlation between earnings and hours, which is .71 instead 
of .99. The restricted and unrestricted models produce very similar estimates 
for the EWM model. 
B. Testing the Model 
A likelihood-ratio test of the fit of the restricted model was performed. 
Reservation utility each week is a free parameter in the unrestricted model. 
The longest observed duration of search in the data was 73 weeks, so the 
number of parameters to be estimated is 73 + 11 (all of the previous 
parameters except Tand C) = 84. 18 The restricted model has 13 parameters 
and is nested in the unrestricted model so a likelihood ratio test of the 
restrictions of the dynamic programming model can be performed, with 
degrees of freedom equal to 71. The likelihood-ratio test statistic value is 
28.1, which is less than the critical value of a%2 (71) variable at conventional 
levels of significance. Thus, the restrictions implied by the dynamic pro- 
gramming EUM model cannot be rejected. Note also that when the EWM 
model was tested against the unrestricted version of the EWM model, the 
restrictions of the former could not be rejected, but the unrestricted EWM 
model is strongly rejected when tested against the unrestricted EUM 
model.19 The results clearly indicate that EWM is inconsistent with the 
data in either the restricted or unrestricted versions of the model. 
Several other methods were used to evaluate the fit of the restricted 
EUM model and to compare the predictions of the fitted utility and wealth- 
measurement error variance in total variance are 15%-25% for annual earnings and 
32%-46% for annual hours (hourly workers only) (Duncan and Hill 1985, table 
3, cols. 3-4). Hence, the results in cols. 1 and 3 in table 3 for the EUM models 
seem reasonable. 
18 For periods in which no transitions to employment were made, a reservation 
utility of infinity provides a perfect fit to the data. In the restricted version of the 
model, the estimated reservation utility for such periods is finite, so a degree of 
freedom is used up for each such period in the unrestricted model. See Wolpin 
(1987) for further discussion. 
19 The x2 value for a test of the EWM model against the unrestricted version of 
the EWM model is 11.9 with 71 degrees of freedom, and the X2 value for a test of 
wealth maximization against utility maximization with both models unrestricted 
is 35.3 with 5 degrees of freedom. 
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maximization models. Table 4 displays the observed hazard rates and ac- 
cepted earnings, hours, and utility and their predicted counterparts from 
the estimated EUM model (col. 1 estimates in table 3) by duration. The 
predicted hazard rates are generally close to the observed rates, and the 
model appears to capture the eventually declining hazard. The predicted 
decline in the hazard rate is due to the decline in the offer rate, offsetting 
the declining reservation utility. The model predicts a roughly constant 
level of utility of accepted offers (which is approximately average hourly 
earnings) with duration, and the data appear to support this, although the 
level of accepted utility is underpredicted.20 The model overpredicts both 
earnings and hours on average, probably due to the fact that utility is 
estimated to depend approximately on their ratio. 
In table 5, I compare predicted job acceptance probabilities by duration 
for the restricted EUM and EWM models. I also compare the proportion 
of accepted offers that exceed the reservation utility or wage level by du- 
ration for the restricted EUM and EWM models. Recall that with mea- 
surement error included in the model the value of accepted offers is not 
constrained to exceed reservation levels. There is little in table 5 to distin- 
guish the two models. The lob acceptance probabilities are quite high and 
quite close in the two models, and the proportion of offers with a value 
exceeding the reservation value is identical in the two models in most 
periods.2 
Table 6 reports the results of a Monte Carlo experiment in which 5,000 
random offers were drawn from the estimated earnings-hours distribution, 
using the column 1 results from table 3. The reservation utility and weekly 
earnings estimates (from the col. 1 and 2 models, respectively, in table 3) 
were then used to predict which of these offers would be accepted in each 
week of search, according to the EUM and EWM models. The proportion 
of offers that would be mistakenly predicted to be rejected and accepted, 
according to the EWM model (corresponding to areas A and B, respectively, 
in fig. 1), is shown in table 6. Over 40% of offers would be mistakenly 
predicted to be rejected according to the EWM model in the first few 
20 The observed value of accepted utility is computed using the estimated value 
of a2 together with actual wages and hours. The unrestricted model produces much 
poorer predictions of accepted utility, wages, and hours because of the low estimated 
means of wages and hours (see table 3, col. 3). The predicted hazards from the 
unrestricted model are slightly more accurate than those from the restricted model. 
21 The reservation utilities estimated as part of the unrestricted model fluctuate 
erratically with duration and are all statistically insignificant but generally decline 
with duration. The job-acceptance probabilities are much lower in the unrestricted 
model because of the low estimated means of wages and hours. The proportion of 
accepted offers with estimated utility greater than estimated reservation utility is 
generally much higher in the unrestricted models, due to reservation utility being 
treated as a free parameter each period. 
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Table 5 
Comparison of Predictions from Expected Utility- and 
Wealth-Maximization Models 
A. Expected-Utility-Maximization Model 
Proportion of Accepted Offers 
Reservation Job with Estimated Utility 
Weekly Acceptance Greater than Estimated 
Duration Utility Probability Reservation Utility 
1-3 6.54 .95 .58 
4-6 6.44 .98 .59 
7-9 6.32 .99 .47 
10-12 6.20 1.00 .85 
13-15 6.06 1.00 .73 
16-20 5.86 1.00 .67 
21-24 5.62 1.00 .75 
25-73 0 1.00 1.00 
B. Expected-Wealth-Maximization Model 
Proportion of Accepted Offers 
Reservation Job with Weekly Wage Greater 
Weekly Acceptance than Estimated Reservation 
Duration Earnings Probability Weekly Earnings 
1-3 201 .97 .51 
4-6 198 .99 .61 
7-9 195 1.00 .53 
10-12 191 1.00 .85 
13-15 187 1.00 .81 
16-20 181 1.00 .67 
21-24 174 1.00 .88 
25-73 0 1.00 1.00 
weeks, with the proportion dropping in later periods. The mistaken pre- 
dictions are for offers with relatively low weekly earnings but also relatively 
low hours. Since the EWM model places no weight on hours in the utility 
function, such offers would generally be rejected, according to this model, 
but would often be accepted according to the EUM model. Almost no 
offers would be mistakenly accepted according to the EWM model.22 
VI. Conclusions 
This article has demonstrated that the reservation weekly earnings hy- 
pothesis can be tested in the context of a job-search model. This hypothesis 
has been maintained in the growing literature on structural estimation of 
search models but has not previously been tested. The results of this study 
lead to rejection of the hypothesis and indicate that imposing it could lead 
to a fairly high proportion of incorrect predictions. There are many possible 
22 The misclassification probability from the unrestricted models is lower in most 
periods and is due entirely to offers being mistakenly accepted rather than rejected, 
except in the first week. 
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Table 6 
Monte Carlo Results on the Proportion of Offers Misclassified 
by the Expected-Wealth-Maximization Model 
Total 
Mistakenly Mistakenly Misclassification 
Duration Reject Accept Probability 
1-3 .38 .04 .44 
4-6 .37 .02 .39 
7-9 .36 .01 .37 
10-12 .36 0 .36 
13-15 .35 0 .35 
16-20 .33 0 .33 
21-24 .31 0 .31 
25-73 0 0 0 
reasons in theory why the reservation weekly earnings property could fail 
to hold, and this article has investigated only one of these causes, hours 
of work in the utility function. Empirical investigation of other possible 
sources of failure of the reservation wage property, such as other nonwage 
job characteristics in utility, risk aversion, and an unknown wage-offer 
distribution, would be useful extensions. It has also been assumed that a 
nondegenerate earnings-hours distribution could exist in equilibrium, but 
there are a number of conditions that must be satisfied for this to be possible, 
and it would be desirable to test whether these conditions are met. For 
example, heterogeneity of preferences may be important but has been as- 
sumed away here.23 
The results obtained in this study suggest that an hourly wage maximi- 
zation model fits the data well and that job offers can be viewed as consisting 
of an hourly wage, with either the employer or the worker choosing hours. 
Whether this is a plausible description of the labor market can be deter- 
mined only by attempting to replicate the results for other groups and 
other samples. However, whether or not hourly wage maximization is the 
best model to describe search behavior, the results clearly indicate that 
wealth maximization is not the best model. 
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